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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
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July 12, 2016 
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Judges 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kenneth Irving Carter appeals the District Court’s 
application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for 
maintaining a stash house.  Because the District Court 
properly applied the enhancement, we will affirm. 
 
 
 
 3 
 
I 
 
 Carter headed a Pennsylvania drug ring, which he 
operated from Detroit, Michigan.  Carter sent two of his 
lieutenants, Jelina Montez Cook and Dewann Jamal Macon, 
to Pennsylvania to oversee the business.  Carter’s operation 
was further supported by additional “employees,” including 
Arley Earheart.   
 
 Cook was responsible for transporting drugs to 
Pennsylvania and readying them for sale.  Macon’s primary 
responsibility was to keep detailed financial records so that he 
could inform Carter about the drug ring’s cash flow.  Macon 
was also responsible for paying expenses, including the 
salaries of various “employees.”1  All disbursements he made 
were on Carter’s behalf.   
 
 Shortly after Macon moved to Pennsylvania, he told 
Carter that he needed to find new living arrangements.  Carter 
tasked Earheart with finding a house where Macon could live 
and run the drug operation.  Earheart found a secluded house 
at 530 Stoney Run Road in Blairsville, Pennsylvania (“Stoney 
Run”), which did not require her to sign a lease or put her 
name on a utility bill.  Earheart obtained Carter’s approval to 
rent the house.  Carter later inspected the property and 
ordered Macon to give Earheart the money for the security 
deposit and rent.  Stoney Run became a base of operations.  
Macon lived at Stoney Run, overseeing the enterprise’s 
                                              
1 Some members of the conspiracy, such as Earheart, 
were paid in drugs as opposed to cash.   
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financial and drug operations, and Earheart retrieved drugs 
from that location for delivery to distributors.2   
 
 Carter’s organization maintained a second house at 
621 Bedford Street in Johnstown, Pennsylvania (“Bedford 
Street”).  Cook lived at Bedford Street, and processed and 
prepared heroin there for delivery to Stoney Run for 
distribution.  As with Stoney Run, Cook paid the Bedford 
Street rent with funds from Macon, directly authorized by 
Carter.   
 
 Following an investigation, which included searches of 
the premises and recovery of drugs at each location, a grand 
jury returned an indictment against Carter and other members 
of the conspiracy.  Carter was charged with conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram 
or more of heroin (Count 1), and conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute Opana pills, an opioid pain 
medication (Count 2), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  
Carter pleaded guilty to Count 1 pursuant to a written plea 
agreement.  The plea agreement contained a limited waiver of 
appellate rights, which allowed Carter to, among other things, 
challenge application of a two-level sentencing enhancement 
for maintaining a residence for the purpose of manufacturing 
and distributing a controlled substance under U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(b)(12), sometimes referred to as the “stash house” 
enhancement. 
                                              
2 Earheart testified about Carter’s involvement in the 
operation’s ongoing activities, specifically noting one 
occasion when Carter threatened Earheart while she was in 
the hospital, and ordered her back to the house to continue 
working.   
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 At sentencing, the District Court heard testimony from 
Earheart and Macon, recounting the facts set forth above 
concerning Carter, the stash houses, and the role the houses 
played in Carter’s drug ring.  Based on their testimony, the 
District Court found that Carter “control[led] activities at the 
residences, namely by controlling distribution of controlled 
substances,” and applied § 2D1.1(b)(12)’s two-level 
enhancement.  App. 140.  The District Court then sentenced 
Carter to 180 months’ in prison.  Carter appeals the 
application of the enhancement. 
 
II3 
 
A 
 
 The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 sought to address, 
among other things, conduct “generally described” in 21 
U.S.C. § 856, which criminalized the maintenance of a 
premises used for drug manufacturing or distribution.  See 
United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 384 (1st Cir. 2015).  To 
this end, the Act directed the Sentencing Commission to 
amend the United States Sentencing Guidelines to add an 
enhancement for defendants engaged in such activity.  See 
United States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 2013).  
The Commission added § 2D1.1(b)(12), which provides for a 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary, 
and we review factual findings for clear error.  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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two-level increase for a defendant who “maintained a 
premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a 
controlled substance.”  For the enhancement to apply, the 
Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant “(1) knowingly (2) open[ed] or 
maintain[ed] any place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing 
or distributing a controlled substance.”  Johnson, 737 F.3d at 
447; United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 531 (7th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 706 (8th 
Cir. 2012).   
 
 Carter does not dispute that the first and third elements 
are met here.  The record shows that Carter knew about the 
activities at the properties, as he was intimately involved in 
the operation of the enterprise, directing both the flow of 
money throughout the organization and controlling his 
employees’ actions in connection with their drug distribution 
activities.   
 
 Similarly, it is undisputed that both properties were 
kept primarily to advance the drug enterprise.  See Johnson, 
737 F.3d at 449 (enhancement does not apply where storage 
at the location was an “incidental or collateral use” for the 
premises).  At both locations, law enforcement found, among 
other things, drugs and drug paraphernalia.  In addition, both 
Macon and Earheart testified that Stoney Run was regularly 
used to store drugs prior to distribution, and the reason for 
renting the property was to provide Macon a place to live and 
work while he was “on assignment” at Carter’s behest.  It is 
also undisputed that Bedford Street was a drug factory where 
Cook prepared product for delivery to Stoney Run and 
eventual sale.  Thus, the only question before us is whether 
Carter “maintained” the premises. 
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 Although the word “maintained” is not defined in 
either § 2D1.1(b)(12) or § 856, two sources provide insight 
into the term’s definition.  See Jones, 778 F.3d at 384.  The 
Guidelines commentary instructs that, in determining whether 
the defendant “maintained” the property, we should consider, 
among other things, (a) whether the defendant “held a 
possessory interest” such as owning or renting the premises, 
and (b) “the extent to which the defendant controlled access 
to, or activities at, the premises.”4  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 
n.17.  Case law examining § 856, which makes it unlawful to 
“knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place . . . 
for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any 
controlled substance,” also provides guidance.  Courts 
interpreting the term “maintain[ing]” in § 856 have looked to 
a variety of factors such as “control, curation, acquisition of 
the site, renting or furnishing the site, repairing the site, 
supervising, protecting, supplying food to those at the site, 
and continuity.”  Jones, 778 F.3d at 384 (quoting United 
States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
 
 Neither the Guidelines commentary nor the case law 
interpreting § 856 requires that the defendant be physically 
present or involved on a daily basis to “maintain” a premises 
for the purpose of the enhancement.  Rather, the enhancement 
is flexible and adaptable to a “variety of factual scenarios.”  
Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 532.  A court may consider, 
                                              
4 We are bound by “Guidelines commentary [] 
interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline.”  
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 
2013)). 
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among other things, whether a defendant “exercise[d] control 
over” the property, id., or supervised or directed others to 
engage in certain activities at the premises, see United States 
v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 857 (5th Cir. 1997).   
 
 Applying these factors, we discern no error in the 
District Court’s application of the stash house enhancement, 
and reject Carter’s arguments to the contrary.  Carter’s 
argument that he lacked the possessory interest necessary to 
have “maintained” the properties because he was not the 
owner or renter is meritless.  Carter appropriately concedes 
that the absence of his name on a deed or lease is insufficient 
to preclude the enhancement’s application.  As the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit observed, “[t]he enhancement 
does not require either ownership or a leasehold,” because “it 
would defy reason for a drug dealer to be able to evade 
application of the enhancement by the simple expedient of 
maintaining his stash house under someone else’s name.”  
Jones, 778 F.3d at 385 (internal citations omitted); see also 
Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 532 (“ownership is not dispositive 
of whether [one] ‘maintains’ a stash house”). 
 
 Carter’s argument that he did not maintain the stash 
house because any money used to operate it came from the 
organization’s funds and not his own profits is also 
unavailing.  Undisputed testimony demonstrates that Carter 
maintained a direct interest in every dollar that came into the 
organization, and that Macon, in managing the day-to-day 
business, had to account to Carter for all revenue and 
expenditures.   
 
 In addition to controlling the funds used to rent the 
properties, Carter played a major role in overseeing the 
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acquisition and operations of the stash houses, despite the fact 
he lived in Detroit.  Macon, who was in Pennsylvania only on 
orders from Carter, needed Carter’s approval to rent the 
location at which Macon resided and carried out his business 
for Carter’s organization.  Carter tasked Earheart with finding 
Stoney Run, personally approved its acquisition, inspected it 
after it was secured, and told Earheart to get the necessary 
funds from Macon to pay the rent.  In addition, Carter 
oversaw the financial management of both Stoney Road and 
Bedford Street, as he directed Macon to pay the rent and any 
other expenses, and demanded details about such transactions.   
 
 Carter also controlled the activities at each location.  
At his direction, Bedford Street was used to prepare drugs for 
distribution.  In addition, Carter ensured that his employees 
were at the house working, going so far as to threaten 
Earheart while she was in the hospital to ensure she returned 
to work.  Thus, the evidence showed that Carter controlled 
the activities of his employees and the places where essential 
parts of the operation were conducted.  With such a high level 
of control, and “[w]here the evidence shows that over a 
period of time the defendant . . . direct[ed] the activities of 
and the people in a place,” Morgan, 117 F.3d at 858, we 
cannot say that the District Court erred in finding that Carter 
“maintained” the stash houses for purposes of applying the 
enhancement. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of sentence. 
